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POSTREVOLUTIONARY 
MOBILIZATION IN CHINA 
The One-Child Policy Reconsidered 
By TYRENE WHITE* 
DURING the 1980s, the study of Chinese politics was dominated by 
the premise that the death of Mao and the rise of Deng Xiaoping 
marked the beginning of a new political epoch. Some scholars argued 
that the political course set in motion at the famous Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Central Committee of December 1978 signaled a fundamental, 
even revolutionary break with the past; others saw a slower drift from a 
monistic system toward a more consultative authoritarianism. 1 Either 
way, the deradicalized, demobilizational thrust of the post-Mao reforms 
appeared to augur China's transition to a "postrevolutionary phase" of 
political normalization, regularized decision making and institutional-
ized party rule. 2 Against that background, China's "one-child-per-cou-
ple" family planning policy, introduced in 1979, appeared to run counter 
to the post-Mao political premise. With its radical goal, collectivist val-
ues, and mobilizational flavor, the one-child policy bore many of the 
characteristics of a Maoist-era mass mobilization campaign. 
To account for this contrast, some scholars considered the one-child 
policy to be an isolated exception to the demobilizational trend; they 
argued that the specter of a looming population crisis that would under-
"'An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 41st Annual Meeting of the Asso-
ciation for Asian Studies, Washington, DC, March 17-19, 1989. The research presented here 
was supported by the Swarthmore College Faculty Research Support Fund; the preparation 
of this manuscript was made possible by a sabbatical from Swarthmore College and a post-
doctoral fellowship from the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University. 
Special thanks to Jean Oi, James Kurth, and Kenneth Sharpe for their comments on earlier 
drafts. Any errors or deficiencies that remain are mine alone. 
'Lowell Dittmer, China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 194g-1981 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Harry Harding, "Political Development in 
Post-Mao China," in A. Doak Barnett and Ralph N. Clough, eds., Modernizing China: Post-
Mao Reform and Development (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 13-37; Harry Harding, 
China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1987); Tang 
Tsou, "Back from the Brink of Revolutionary-Feudal Totalitarianism," in Victor Nee and 
David Mozingo, eds., State and Society in Contemporary China (Ithaca, NY, and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1983), 53-88. 
2 Richard Lowenthal, "The Post-Revolutionary Phase in China and Russia," Studies in 
Comparative Communism 16 (Autumn 1983), 191-201; Dittmer (fn. 1), 11. 
World Politics 43 (October 1990), 53-76 
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54 WORLD POLITICS 
cut the modernization goals of the new elite left no alternative to a strict 
birth control program.3 Others, however, assumed that, all reformist 
statements and policies notwithstanding, the one-child campaign was 
revelatory-that is, evidence of a mobilization regime at its intrusive, 
penetrative worst.4 Still others maintained that the enduring mobiliza-
tional impulse revealed by the one-child campaign was an artifact of the 
previous revolutionary epoch that would slowly disappear during the 
transition to institutionalized party rule. 5 What these views had in com-
mon was their implicit reference to an underlying model of Leninist 
regimes, one in which mobilization cannot outlive the transition to post-
revolutionary communism. This model was most fully elaborated by 
Richard Lowenthal, who argued that, as modernization proceeds, the 
political attributes of the revolutionary phase-personalized, charismatic 
rule, revolutionary class struggle, and mass mobilization in pursuit of 
radical political and economic goals-inevitably give way to the post-
revolutionary politics of oligarchic rule, regularized decision making, 
and party institutionalization.6 
The Lowenthal model has drawn criticism on many counts,7 but the 
hypothesis that postrevolutionary regimes eventually lose the capacity 
and desire to use mobilizational means has met no serious challenge. 
Kenneth Jowitt, for example, warned against interpreting the transition 
as a smooth and unilinear one. He argued that the difficult process of 
transition from revolutionary consolidation to postrevolutionary rule-
or in his words, from the task of mobilization to the task of "inclu-
sion"-frequently triggers mobilizational responses from threatened 
party elites. He also rejected the notion of a strict dichotomy between the 
mobilization and postmobilization phases, arguing for the existence of 
"amalgam-regimes" that represent "fragile combinations" of the two. 
Stressing that coexistence did not imply compatibility, however, he con-
3 Martin King Whyte, "Who Hates Bureaucracy? A Chinese Puzzle," in Victor Nee and 
David Stark, eds., Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), 233-54; Joyce K. Kallgren, "Politics, Wel-
fare, and Change: The Single-Child Family in China," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine 
Wong, eds., The Political Economy of Ref01m in Post-Mao China (Council on East Asian 
Studies, Harvard University, 1985), 131-56. 
4 Steven W. Mosher, Broken Earth: The Rural Chinese (New York: Free Press, 1983). 
5 Harding (fn. 1, 1986). 
6 Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Politics," in Chalmers 
Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970), 
33-116; Lowenthal (fn. 2). 
7 For a cogent review of these critiques, see David Stark and Victor Nee, "Toward an 
Institutional Analysis of State Socialism," in Nee and Stark (fn. 3), 1-31. See also Constance 
Squires Meany, "Is the Soviet Present in China's Future?" World Politics 39 (January 1987), 
203-30; Kenneth Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes," World 
Politics 28 (October 1975), 69-96. 
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curred with Lowenthal on the fundamental conflict between mobiliza-
tional and postmobilizational methods of political rule, describing the 
two methods as stark opposites. According to Jowitt, mobilization is 
characterized by the "controlled or elite-directed disruption" of "social, 
personal, institutional, and psychological" routines, as opposed to "the 
methodical consideration and management of tasks" characteristic of 
postrevolutionary rule.8 
Do these propositions fit the Chinese case? The brutal crackdown on 
the 1989 democracy movement was a perfect illustration of Jowitt's 
"threat-reaction" model of elite response to a regime-threatening crisis. 
In this essay, however, I will argue that mobilization has remained an 
integral, active part of the postrevolutionary Chinese political process, 
not merely a reactive tool of fearful conservatives. Using the one-child 
campaign as a case study, I will demonstrate that the instrument of mo-
bilization in Chinese politics, the mass campaign, was inherited by Deng 
Xiaoping as a part of the institutional legacy of the Maoist regime. De-
spite their unambiguous repudiation of Maoist campaign methods in 
1978, the post-Mao reformers sought to harness them in practice for their 
own purposes, transforming an instrument of calculated disruption into 
an instrument of methodical, engineered change. As a result, the form, 
content, and intensity of the campaign changed over the course of the 
decade, but mobilization remained an essential instrument of communist 
party rule, particularly in the countryside. 
MoBILIZATION AFTER MAo 
One of the defining characteristics of the Maoist era in Chinese politics 
(1949-1976) was the continual use of "mass mobilization campaigns" 
(qunzhong yundong) to achieve socialist goals. Although mobilizational 
methods were a standard tool of political organization in other Leninist 
regimes, the Chinese campaigns were distinctive for the "utter serious-
ness" with which political study and ideological transformation were 
pursued.9 For Mao, revolutionary goals were primary; under his leader-
ship, China's revolutionary politics oscillated between two types of inten-
sive mass participation and political struggle. The first was "storming," 
the distinctively Maoist model of mobilization from below, in which the 
8 Ibid., 93 and 94-95. Jowitt's challenge goes far toward acknowledging a continuing role 
for mobilization in postrevolutionary regimes, but whereas he views the continued use of 
mobilization to be negative or reactive, a "response to the problems and challenges" of ex-
panding the bases of regime support, I view it as a positive instrument of power. 
• Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 121. 
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elite party membership is subjected to rectification by the nonelite 
masses. The second was "engineering," the Maoist-Liuist-Leninist 
model of party-controlled mobilization from above in pursuit of specific 
and practical goals.' 0 
Campaigns served at least three vital functions during the Maoist era. 
First, they helped the party transcend its own organizational limits by 
recruiting and leading mass participants in a wide variety of tasks-
everything from implementing new marriage laws, to disease control, to 
eliminating counterrevolutionaries." This function was particularly im-
portant during the 1950s, when mass involvement was needed to rein-
force the party's administrative capacities and to indoctrinate and mobi-
lize a newly liberated population. Second, campaigns were tools for 
correcting various bureaucratic and political ills. They were used to rec-
tify the party, promote discipline and unity, purify the state bureaucracy, 
and prevent the entrenchment of elite-mass cleavages. Third, campaigns 
were used as populist instruments of permanent revolution to "smash" 
the party/state apparatus. 12 
The post-Mao leadership formally repudiated all three functions of 
the mass campaign. Mao's culminating effort at smashing the party/state 
during the Cultural Revolution had such force and consequence that the 
post-Mao elite, victims of the process, formally abandoned mobiliza-
tional politics and fostered the process of institution building. '3 The new 
leaders replaced mass campaigns and permanent revolution with routin-
ization and modernization as the primary means and ends of state power 
in post-Mao China. Radicalism gave way to "systems engineering," with 
all its attendant overtones of incremental manipulation of countless so-
cial, political, and economic levers. And populist, revolutionary methods 
of mass participation gave way to imperfect electoral mechanisms, ex-
panded public debates and channels for political expression and influ-
ence, glorification of the rule of law, and a shrinking monopoly of party 
power. In short, the post-Mao elite fundamentally redefined its historical 
mission, abandoning the rapid achievement of revolutionary ends by 
means of class struggle in favor of the steady development of the "pri-
mary stage of socialism" and the construction of a "socialist spiritual civ-
' 0 Dittmer (fn. 1 ), 6. For other discussions of mobilization, see Squires Meany (fn. 7), and 
Walder (fn. 9), 113-22. 
"Charles P. Cell, Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China (New York: Aca-
demic Press, 1977), rn6-7. 
"Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 194']-1976 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1981), 331-33; Dittmer (fn. 1), 6-8. 
' 3 Squires Meany (fn. 7); Tang Tsou (fn. 1). 
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ilization.'' 1 4 In so doing, the elite brought the Maoist revolutionary phase 
to an end. 
The question is whether the end of the revolutionary phase meant the 
end of party-led mobilization, as was the case in the Soviet Union.' 5 De-
spite the formal repudiation of mass movements, only the third type of 
mobilization campaign disappeared entirely in the 1980s. Mobilization 
was still employed to achieve political goals, such as party rectification 
(1983-1986), eliminating spiritual pollution (1983), and countering bour-
geois liberalization (1987 and 1989). It was also used to achieve substan-
tive goals, such as obligatory tree planting, electoral reform, and control-
ling economic crime. '6 Nowhere has the use of mobilization been more 
sustained or controversial, however, than in the arena of family planning. 
A. THE "ONE-CHrLD-PER-CouPLE" MoBILIZATION 
CAMPAIGN, 1979-1983 
The effort to limit couples to only one child began just as China's new 
leadership was repudiating Maoist campaign methods. There is no 
shared, unambiguous definition of a mass campaign or its precise form, 
but the family planning campaign implemented between 1979 and 1983 
fulfilled and exceeded every basic requirement. Two studies of cam-
paigns and their dynamics, Gordon Bennett's Yundong and Charles Cell's 
Revolution at Work, provide working definitions. Bennett defined the 
campaign as "a government-sponsored effort to storm and eventually 
overwhelm strong but vulnerable barriers to the progress of socialism 
through intensive mass mobilization of active personal commitment."'? 
Cell relied on the definition provided by a 1959 article in Hongqi (Red 
Flag), which described the campaign as an "organized mobilization of 
collective action aimed at transforming thought patterns, class/power re-
lationships and/or economic institutions and productivity." More simply, 
he noted that "all campaigns involve an increased intensity of activity 
'4 Zhao Ziyang, "Advance Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," 
Beijing Review 45, November 9--15, 1987, pp. 1-XXVII. 
'' In the Chinese case, the communique of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee in December 1978 and the resolution on CCP history adopted in June 1981 
marked the end of the revolutionary phase. The parallel moment in Soviet history was the 
party program adopted at the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961. On the Soviet case, see 
Lowenthal (fn. 2). 
' 6 Lester Ross, "Obligatory Tree Planting: The Role of Campaigns in Policy Implemen-
tation in Post-Mao China," and Barrett L. McCormick, "Leninist Implementation: The 
Election Campaign," both in David M. Lampton, ed., Policy Implementation in Post-Mao 
China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 225-52 and 383-413. 
'' Gordon A. Bennett, Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership (Berke-
ley, CA: Center for Chinese Studies, 1976), 18. 
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beyond what is expected in regular work and living routines"; "what 
may not start out as a campaign may in due course become one, or vice 
versa." 18 
Both definitions suggest two irreducible characteristics of the mass 
campaign. First, its substantive goal is to advance socialism by targeting 
a particular obstacle and/or by promoting a particular ideal. Second, the 
procedural requirements for a mass campaign are that it be organized 
and launched from above, led by the party and mass organizations, and 
that the masses be mobilized beyond their normal routines. The one-
child campaign met all of these criteria. 
First, with the immediate task of building socialism redefined to be 
the achievement of the four modernizations, promoting the policy of one 
child per couple not only explicitly aided economic goals; it also targeted 
old habits and customs that had been variously described as decadent or 
feudal, and that stood as barriers to socialist development. For example, 
such traditional sayings as "men are superior to women" and "the more 
children, the more happiness" became objects of condemnation in prop-
aganda campaigns, as did the associated behavior of female infanticide. '9 
The policy of promoting only one child per couple and denouncing the 
traditional preference for sons was tantamount to launching a narrowly 
defined cultural revolution. 
Second, beginning in 1979, the call for the one-child family led to 
nationwide mobilization. Hua Guofeng set forth the impossible goal of 
reducing the population growth rate to five per thousand by 1985; Chen 
Muhua, head of the State Council Leading Group for Family Planning, 
called for a mass campaign to achieve this target. 20 Provincial leaders 
responded by holding mobilization meetings attended by representatives 
of all party, government, and mass organizations; recruiting family plan-
ning activists and propagandists from various units; sending medical and 
propaganda teams into the countryside to promote birth control; and 
publishing articles glorifying the one-child family. 21 
Subsequently, implementation of the one-child program involved the 
use of standard campaign methods. Both Bennett and Cell listed specific 
' 8 Cell (fn. 11), 7. 
' 9 Foreign Broadcast lnf01mation Service, Daily Report-China [hereafter cited as FBJS], 
February 15, 1980, p. L14; Renmin Ribao, September 25, 1980, p. 1. 
"° FBIS (Supplement No. 15), July 2, 1979, p. 19; Sichuan Provincial Service, December 17, 
1979, in FBIS, December 18, 1979, p. Q3; Li Xiuzhen, "Dangqian jihua shengyu gongzuode 
xingshi he renwu" [The current situation and tasks in family planning work], Renkou Yanjiu 
l (1980), 3· 
"Tyrene White, "Population Policy and Rural Reform in China, 1977-1984: Policy Im-
plementation and Interdependency at the Local Level" /Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 
1985), chap. 3. 
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indicators of campaign activity, with Cell providing the most exhaustive 
list. 22 Three types of indicators emerge from his classification: first, infor-
mational indicators (newspaper articles, slogans, mobilization meetings, 
targets for criticism, stories for emulation, pamphlets, signs, banners, ex-
hibits); second, organizational indicators (sending in outside cadres, cre-
ating work teams, reallocation of resources, curtailment of other pro-
grams or activities, disruption of work routines or reorganization of the 
unit); third, mass participation indicators (letter writing; participating af-
ter regular work hours; mobilization of minority, youth, or other special 
groups and organizations; study groups; struggle and/or criticism ses-
sions; local, regional and national rallies). 
Virtually all of the above tools were used between 1979 and 1984 to 
implement the one-child policy. 2 3 Telephone conferences and mobiliza-
tion meetings were employed to energize cadres and to disseminate cam-
paign targets. Special medical teams were sent to perform sterilizations 
and abortions, or to insert intrauterine devices. Propagandists filled 
newspapers with model stories and educational editorials, and cadres 
who violated the new policy were used as negative models for public 
discussion. In rural areas, where the greatest resistance was encountered, 
local party cadres held as many as nine or ten mobilization meetings per 
year in one locality.24 Normative and material incentives, such as glori-
fication meetings and cash rewards, were used to encourage compliance. 
Those who resisted, however, encountered coercive measures. In the 
most extreme cases, women were forcibly taken to clinics for abortions 
or other procedures; more typical, however, was the practice of making 
women attend endless meetings without pay, or subjecting couples to 
propaganda and harassment in their homes. 2 5 
Although the struggle sessions against offenders did not take on the 
intensity of those against political targets during the Maoist period, in-
dividuals, and wayward cadres in particular, were isolated and criticized 
publicly as examples. Their punishment frequently went beyond eco-
"Bennett (fn. 17), 38-74; Cell (fn. 11), 92-1 IO. 
'3 The primary literature on this period is vast. For analyses and descriptions, see Tyrene 
White, "Implementing the 'One-Child-per-Couple' Population Program in Rural China: 
National Goals and Local Politics," in Lampton, ed. (fn. 16), 284-317; Mosher (fn. 4), 224-
61; john S. Aird, "Coercion in Family Planning: Causes, Methods and Consequences," in 
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, China's Economy Looks toward the Year 2000, vol. 
1, The Four Modernizations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), 184-221. 
'• Yuan Fang and Gu Shengzu, "Nongye shengchan zerenzhi qianhoude jihua shengyu 
guanli tizhide bijiao fenxi" [A comparative analysis of the managerial system of family plan-
ning work before and after the agricultural responsibility system], Shehuixue yu shehui diaocha 
2 (1987), 7-16. 
'' On these practices, see Aird (fn. 23) and Mosher (fn. 4). 
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nomic sanctions, even to the point of obligatory sterilization.26 Con-
versely, cadre mobilization and emulation efforts were taken very seri-
ously. In one Hubei village, the local "women's leader" (a female cadre 
in charge of women's affairs and family planning in each of China's 
production brigades and teams) attributed her brigade's exemplary rec-
ord on birth control to the example set by the local cadres. She and the 
brigade's eight team-level women's leaders had undergone "voluntary" 
sterilizations when the one-child campaign began. 2 7 Thus did they dem-
onstrate their willingness to "take the lead" in family planning and set a 
good example for the masses. 
I~ short, though the scope of the family planning campaign did not 
rival the radical political campaigns of the Maoist era, it was a classic 
mobilization drive of major proportions. Over time, however, pressures 
to bring campaign tactics in line with the requirements of an ongoing 
process of rural reform gave rise to a variant form of mobilization poli-
tics. 
B. THE Pouncs OF INSTITUTIONALIZED MoBILIZATION, 1984-1989 
Although mobilization for family planning was continuous in the 
early 1980s, the environment for implementing the one-child policy had 
changed dramatically by the end of the Sixth Five-Year Plan in 1985. At 
the time the campaign was launched in 1979, the regime of Hua Guofeng 
was fostering a mobilizational style of politics that had direct antecedents 
in the Maoist era. By the end of that year, however, political campaigns 
had been rejected as tools of policy implementation, and the reform co-
alition of Deng Xiaoping was rapidly consolidating power. As a result, 
the traditional language of mass mobilization was softened even while 
the demand for a one-child norm became more insistent. 
By September 1980, cadres were exhorted not to rely on coercion to 
enforce the policy; they were told to make family planning a part of their 
routine work. The one-child campaign continued, however, with the 
Central Committee and the Communist Youth League issuing an un-
precedented "Open Letter" to all party and youth league members urg-
ing them to "take the lead" in having only one child.28 In the cities, 
effective enforcement was made possible by the close surveillance of 
' 6 Beijing City Service, April 12, 1980, in FBIS, April 21, 1980, p. R1; Renmin Ribao, April 
11, 1980, p. 4; Kyodo, June 26, 1980, in FBIS, June 27, 1980, p. Q1. 
'' Interview file, by the author, May 23, 1982, Huashan commune. This interview was 
conducted as part of two periods of rural fieldwork in China (February-December 1982 and 
September 1983-June 1984). The commune (now reclassified a rural town) is situated to the 
northeast of Wuhan municipality, Hubei Province. Additional information on the field site 
and interview procedures may be found in White (fn. 21). 
' 8 Renmin Ribao, September 25, 1980, p. 1. 
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women in the workplace and in neighborhoods, but rural enforcement 
posed enormous obstacles. Not only did the peasants strongly resist the 
one-child limit, but the pattern of rural organization underwent radical 
changes between 1980 and 1983 as the defining institutions of the Maoist 
era were dismantled. Household farming on collectively owned land re-
placed collectivized agriculture, separate organs of township government 
and economic management supplanted the people's commune, and the 
revival of free markets broke the party's absolute grip on rural income. 
These structural changes diminished the political and economic power 
of rural cadres and substantially reduced the dependency and vulnera-
bility of the peasantry. The changes also weakened a vital component of 
the local enforcement structure for family planning-grassroots wom-
en's leaders in production brigades and teams. 29 As local activists, these 
women had provided the crucial link between the party hierarchy and 
rural women of child-bearing age by monitoring pregnancies and "mo-
bilizing" for compliance; they now found that the political rewards of 
cadre service did not outweigh the material rewards of household pro-
duction. Like other laborers, they were allotted plots of land and were 
obliged to fulfill their household responsibility contracts. At the same 
time, pressures to reduce the number of "nonproductive" cadres de-
prived them of the small administrative subsidy once provided by the 
brigade. Finally, in the altered political climate of the 1980s, women's 
leaders found themselves not just deprived of the status once implied in 
cadre service, but in danger of assault or abuse for their role in the family 
planning campaign.3° 
Although the situation stabilized by 1984, these changes provoked a 
sense of panic about family planning work during 1982 and 1983, as 
officials feared that grassroots organizational disarray or paralysis was 
undercutting the one-child campaign. To compensate for rising birth 
rates and organizational deficiencies, a sterilization campaign had been 
launched in late 1982 that continued sporadically through 1983 and 1984. 
It was specifically directed at couples who were under the age of forty 
and already had two or more children, and it was designed to reduce the 
incidence of third or additional birthsY The full dimensions of the mo-
'9 White (fn. 23). 
30 One report from a county in Jiangsu Province indicated that there had been 381 "inci-
dents of revenge" in twelve towns and townships in an eighteen-month period, of which 32 
percent were related to family planning. See Su Suining, "There Are Many Causes of 
Strained Relations between Cadres and Masses in the Rural Areas," Nongmin Ribao, Septem-
ber 26, 1988, p. 1, in FBIS, October 7, 1988, p. 13. 
3' Xinhua, November 1, 1982, in FBIS, November 3, 1982, p. K20; Qian Xinzhong, "Nuli 
kaichuang jihua shengyu xuanchuan jiaoyu gongzuo xin jumian" [Make great efforts to 
initiate the new phase of family planning propaganda and education work], Renkouxue Kan 
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bilization remain unclear, but by the end of February 1983, nearly nine 
million "birth control operations" had been performed nationally, a fig-
ure 1.6 times the total for all of 1982.32 In Hubei Province alone, one 
million sterilizations occurred over the course of 1983.33 
By the end of 1983, other elite priorities began to overtake the one-
child campaign. A party rectification campaign was launched, a central 
feature of which was to correct the bad "work style" of many party 
members and to improve party-mass relations. In addition, the reformers 
were poised to push through new rural reforms at the end of 1983 that 
would commercialize the rural economy and break up the party's mo-
nopoly of supply and distribution. At the same time, the township gov-
ernments that had replaced people's communes were placed on a tighter 
fiscal leash, with expenditures for basic activities like family planning set 
in an annual fixed budget. In this shifting political, economic, and insti-
tutional context, a new central document on family planning was issued 
in 1984. Central Document 7 departed from its predecessors by allowing 
some restricted exceptions to the one-child limit, exceptions that applied 
to about 5 percent of all couples of child-bearing age among the majority 
Han population (rules for minorities were slightly less strict). More im-
portantly, the document repudiated the use of coercion to enforce the 
one-child limit, stressing instead the need for routine and patient work 
in order to gain compliance.34 Subsequently, family planning was de-
clared to be a fundamental state policy: the government stressed the ob-
ligation of Chinese citizens to engage in family planning, and made ef-
forts to build an organizational structure for routine administration. Yet 
the gap between official family planning targets and the capacity of the 
formal party/state apparatus to reach them undermined efforts to regu-
larize grassroots implementation. Instead, the implementation process 
settled unstably into a pattern of institutionalized mobilization. 
Institutionalized mobilization is a variant form of implementation, 
which involves periodic, functionally defined mobilization efforts that (1) 
temporarily intensify coercive and normative incentives; (2) vary from 
region to region in timing, intensity, and scope; (3) last for limited, pre-
dictable periods of time (often specified at the outset); (4) have as their 
1 (1983), 9; Xinhua, January IO, 1983, in FBIS, January 13, 1983, pp. K13-14; Beijing Do-
mestic Service, January 27, 1983, in FBIS, March 3, 1983, p. K11; Shi Chengli, "Wo guo jihua 
shengyu gongzuode fenqi" [Analysis of our country's family planning work], Xibei Renkou 
1 (1988), 31; interview conducted by the author, June 8, 1984, Family Planning Commission, 
Hubei Province. 
l' Shi (fn. 31), 31. 
ii Interview (fn. 31). 
J4 Jihua Shengyu Ban, Jiankang Bao, March 9, 1984. 
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primary goal behavioral control or "practical results," not attitudinal or 
cultural change; (5) have a diminished scope of mass participation in 
favor of narrow mobilizations of the target population; and (6) utilize 
extensive propaganda to shape public sentiment, but discourage disrup-
tive mobilizational activities beyond the target population in order to 
insulate the project from economic production and other reform initia-
tives. 
Several aspects of the family planning campaign illustrate the pattern 
of institutionalized mobilization. The family planning bureaucracy and 
delivery network has been strengthened, funding and personnel have 
increased, routine procedures have been developed to administer the 
work and coordinate with other relevant departments (for example, pub-
lic health and civil affairs), and supplemental regulations have been 
drafted to clarify policy. Family planning work has been thoroughly pro-
fessionalized; demographers, sociologists, and other social scientists are 
involved in the policy-making and implementation processes, and full-
time family planning workers are trained and placed at the local level. 
National meetings are held regularly in order to assess ongoing work. 
Grassroots cadres have forms, procedures, and timetables for gathering 
data on local demographic trends. New loopholes in the control system, 
such as the problem of unmonitored peasants who migrate temporarily 
to the cities, are closed as new procedures are developed-in this case by 
requiring local commercial bureaus and offices to withhold enterprise 
licenses from individuals who violate family planning regulations.35 
None of these developments has obviated the need for mobilizational 
methods, however. The strict one-child limit has been progressively re-
laxed since 1984 in order to make the policy "acceptable to the peas-
ants."36 As a result, rural couples whose first-born is a daughter are au-
tomatically eligible for a second child.37 This relaxation has partially 
accommodated the demand for male offspring that frustrated earlier en-
forcement efforts, but it has not put an end to peasant resistance. Couples 
with one son or two daughters often bear additional children; the re-
quired four-year interval between the first and second birth is routinely 
ignored; and village leaders conspire with relatives and friends to conceal 
"excess" births from higher authorities. 
is De Ming, "China's Population Situation Remains Grim," Liaowang Overseas Edition 17 
(April 25, 1988), 10---11, in FBIS, May 11, 1988, p. 28. 
36 China Daily, April 19, 1988, p. 1. 
37 Zhejiang Ribao, September 27, 1987, in FBIS, October 13, 1987, pp. 31-32; China Daily, 
July 30, 1987, p. 3; Zhao Yugui, "Zhongshi liudong renkoude jihua shengyu guanli" [Pay 
attention to the management of family planning work for the floating population], Renkou 
yu Jingji 2 ( 1988), 5. 
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Continuing resistance to a one- or two-child limit is not the only mo-
tive for mobilization. Because the targeted age cohort is constantly re-
plenishing itself, because today's compliant couples may become tomor-
row's problem, and because overworked rural leaders find it convenient 
to neglect family planning, only periodic mobilization can indoctrinate 
young couples and emphasize the determination of the state to prevail. 
Family planning propaganda and education campaigns occur predictably 
in the summer and winter; the campaigns are coordinated with agricul-
tural slack seasons, the corresponding national work conferences that 
review local and national statistics, and the Chinese New Year (a time 
for spousal reunions and marriages). They still require the temporary 
mobilization of propagandists, family planning workers, and medical 
personnel for grassroots work. Propaganda activity and intensive indoc-
trination have ceased to be the centerpiece of the campaign, however. 
Instead, the focus is on the achievement of practical results by carrying 
out medical procedures such as sterilizations, abortions, and IUD inser-
tions on the spot.38 For example, in the fall of 1987 Zhejiang Province 
launched a "family planning publicity and technical service campaign," 
in which "areas lagging behind" in family planning work were urged to 
"strive for a marked improvement during the campaign."39 Similarly, a 
circular prepared for family planning month in Yunnan (January 1987) 
stressed the need to "mobilize the masses to vigorously and conscien-
tiously implement the measures for birth control and remedial mea-
sures" (that is, abortions).4° 
Although national officials like Peng Peiyun, head of the State Family 
Planning Commission, stressed that cadres "should not neglect regular 
work and then merely rely on temporary mobilization work,"4, local 
enforcement still revolves around centrally disseminated targets and 
quotas that trigger periodic mobilizations and "shock drives" at the local 
level. A classic example of this pattern is the May 1985 campaign that 
was waged in a suburban village outside Xiamen municipality, Fujian 
Province, and reported by Huang Shu-min.42 In May 1985, the village 
leaders suddenly announced a strict new policy on having a second child 
and ordered all women of child-bearing age to report for examinations 
to detect pregnancies. The decision was made summarily and backed up 
18 Zhejiang Ribao, July 25, 1986, p. 1. 
39 Zhejiang Ribao, September 27, 1987, in FBIS, October 13, 1987, 31-32. 
4" Yunnan Provincial Service, January 5, 1987, in FBIS, January 7, 1987, p. Q2. 
4 ' Yang Chaoling and Li Qin, "Peng Peiyun, Minister of the State Family Planning Com-
mission, on China's Family Planning Situation and Policy," Liaowang Overseas Edition 17 
(April 1988), 9-w, in FBIS, May 2, 1988, p. 35. 
4' Huang Shu-min, The Spiral Road: Change zn a Chinese Communist Village through the 
Eyes of a Communist Party Leader (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 175-85. 
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by the terse announcement that those who failed to comply would be cut 
off from village business activities. Despite the reforms, this threat was 
extremely potent, since village approval for permits and loans smoothed 
the way for many of the private economic activities that produced the 
bulk of income for many village households. No educational meetings 
were held, no propaganda announcements were made. On the appointed 
day, however, a special work team from the township arrived in the 
village to consult with the village party secretary and to transport preg-
nant women to the township hospital. The work team was one of several 
sent out by the township, each assigned to cover a group of villages. 
Although the events in the village were straightforward, they do not 
reveal how the mobilization process made its way to the village level or 
explain the timing of the campaign. Media reports from the period reveal 
that, in standard campaign fashion, the impetus came from higher levels 
of government. During 1984 and 1985, most provinces responded to new 
central guidelines on family planning by adopting new or modified reg-
ulations at meetings of their provincial people's congresses. Because 1985 
was the final year of the Sixth Five-Year Plan, extra pressure was placed 
on all provinces and localities to meet the targets of the plan. The ap-
proach taken by each province varied, however; the timing tended to 
coincide with the convening of the provincial people's congress, the of-
ficial legislative body of the province. In Fujian, the Third Session of the 
Sixth People's Congress was held in late April and early May, at which 
time a special forum on family planning was held. According to a radio 
report on the meeting, the delegates were told that they "must do a good 
job on work in May and June, a key period on which the success of the 
population control tasks in the whole year depends."43 Once this provin-
cial directive was translated into specific quotas for each county and 
township, it resulted in the deliberate and methodical village-level mo-
bilization. 
In 1987, Sichuan provincial authorities launched a summer "propa-
ganda, inspection and implementation drive";44 in Hainan, regional of-
ficials organized a springtime "shock drive." Cadres were instructed to 
summon up the greatest resolve to organize the family planning shock 
drive, and achieve unified leadership, arrangements, and action .... It is 
necessary to focus on remedial measures regarding pregnancies not cov-
ered by the plan, and also do a good job in carrying out ligation surgery 
after the birth of a second child and inserting an intrauterine device after 
the birth of a first.45 
43 Fujian Provincial Service, May 3, 1985, in FBIS, May 9, 1985, p. 01. 
44 Sichuan Provincial Service, June 11, 1987, in FBIS, June 12, 1987, p. Q1. 
45 Hainan Island Service, May 1, 1987, in FBIS, May 4, 1987, p. P1. 
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Two weeks later, regional officials reported that, between April 27 and 
May 9, more than 8,700 procedures, including 4,244 tubal ligations, had 
been performed.46 After criticizing areas that were still lagging behind, 
they called for a "new high tide," and issued specific instructions: 
Prior to the end of June, all cities and counties must accomplish over 50 
percent of the special annual family planning tasks set by the administra-
tive regional authorities. 
Second, in bringing about the high tide ... all cities and counties must 
regard the task of collecting fees imposed on those who have exceeded the 
limit to the number of births as an important task, and ensure the imple-
mentation of measures for sterilization through the promotion of the task 
of collecting fees imposed on those who have exceeded the limit to the 
number of births. 
Third, public health departments ... must send a number of medical 
personnel with high political and professional standards to serve people 
undergoing sterilization operations.47 
When Hainan officials met in February 1988 to review the previous 
year's work and plan for the future, their report captured precisely the 
effort to fuse regular work with campaign tactics: 
We must establish and put on a sound basis family planning laws, rules 
and regulations, and beef up the family planning organs and personnel. 
Shock family planning drives must be regularly organized and combined 
in an organic way, with the emphasis on practical results.48 
Weak grassroots organization also makes mobilization a necessity. 
Professionals and full-time family planning workers may staff family 
planning organs at or above the county level, and sometimes at the town-
ship (previously the commune) level; below the township level, family 
planning, if done at all, is conducted by party cadres and women's lead-
ers-that is, local political leaders and activists. 49 After 1984, when struc-
tural reform of the communes was completed, all township governments 
were supposed to be staffed by a full-time cadre for public health and 
family planning. In many areas, however, townships have refused to pay 
such individuals out of collective revenues, but the state has not put them 
on its payroll either. As a result, many townships have no family plan-
ning cadre, or one that is poorly paid.50 At the village (brigade) and small 
46 Ibid.; Hainan Island Service, May 18, 1987, in FBIS, May 20, 1987, p. P2. 
47 Ibid., pp. P2-3. 
48 Hainan Island Service, February 17, 1988, in FBJS, February 18, 1988, p. 21. 
49 Henan Nianjian, 1985 [Yearbook of Henan Province, 1985] (1986), 597. By 1987, Qinghai 
Province reported that 30% of all townships and towns had no family planning organs. 
Qinghai Provincial Service, February 20, 1987, in FBIS, February 27, 1987, p. T2. See also 
Liaoning Provincial Service, February 28, 1988, in FBIS, March 3, 1988, p. 38. 
so Qinghai Provincial Service, February 20, 1987, in FB/S, February 27, 1987, p. T2. See 
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group (team) levels, family planning came under the purview of the local 
women's leader, but team-level cadres slowly disappeared after 1984 and 
village leaders often refused to employ a family planning cadre, leaving 
the job of enforcing local birth quotas to unpaid representatives of the 
Women's Association. Even where cadres are in place, however, many 
of them are villagers first and cadres second where family planning is 
concerned. They will respond to signals from higher authorities, but pro-
fessionalization does not reach into the village. In short, functional spe-
cialization deteriorates rapidly at the township level and below, and nei-
ther the collective nor the state has the funds to remedy the problem 
entirely. Instead, family planning associations have been organized down 
to the village level in the hope that locally mobilized and functionally 
defined mass organizations will contribute to the stabilization of the 
workY Thus, at the grassroots, politically weak, poorly skilled, and un-
derpaid women's leaders, activists, and association members rely on local 
party mobilization in order to cope with recalcitrant villagers. In 1988, 
this dependency on the party apparatus led central leaders specifically to 
exempt family planning from ongoing efforts to reduce party interfer-
ence in routine government workY 
Finally, although the intensity of family planning propaganda has de-
clined since 1985, family planning work has constantly been linked to 
other political, ideological, or morality movements, including party rec-
tification, the antibourgeois liberalization campaign, and the call to build 
a socialist spiritual civilization. The linkage is designed to reinforce the 
collective value and larger moral purpose of individual decisions to com-
ply voluntarily with family planning goals, and to associate policy viola-
tors with politically suspect, morally bankrupt, or criminally inclined el-
ements. 
In sum, implementation of the one-child policy continues to meet the 
two primary characteristics of a mobilization campaign---organized, 
routine-altering activity for the purpose of defeating a barrier to socialist 
development. Since 1984, however, the predictability, decentralization, 
and routinization of the mobilization process has transformed the cam-
paign into a mobilizational instrument of some precision. While the 
Communist Party is unwilling to alienate the critical pro-reform peasant 
also Liaoning Provincial Service, February 28, 1988, in FBIS, March 3, 1988, p. 38. In some 
cases, "family planning cadres" were individuals who held more than one work portfolio 
simultaneously. See Shuai Zepeng, "Jihua shengyu ganbu duiwude guanli jidai jiaqiang" 
[Management of family planning cadre ranks in urgent need of strengthening], Renkou Yan-
jiu 4 (July 1988), 59. Tianjin Ribao, March 13, 1990, in FBIS, April 11, 1990, pp. 45-46. 
5' FBIS, February 19, 1988, p. 23. 
5' Xinhua, January 20, 1988, in FBIS, January 21, 1988, p. 6. 
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constituency by demanding strict enforcement of a one-child limit, it is 
equally unwilling to channel more state funds into the development of a 
rural family planning bureaucracy or to let resistance to birth control 
undermine its economic goals. The routine bureaucratic process has 
therefore been joined to the party's grassroots mobilizational tradition to 
yield a specific form of postrevolutionary mobilization. This hybrid is 
not simply a halfway measure between the artificially constructed polar-
ities of revolutionary mobilization and rational-legal forms of enforce-
ment, however. Instead, it is a new variation on the single political theme 
of Communist Party rule in China. The context for campaign imple-
mentation has changed, but mobilizational impulses and the institutional 
arrangements that produce them have endured. 
C. THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED MoBILIZATION 
By early 1990, it was clear that China's family planning program was 
in jeopardy. The State Statistical Bureau reported steady population 
growth rates of about 1.4 percent between 1987 and 1989-rates higher 
than planned, but within an acceptable range. Surveys conducted under 
the auspices of the State Family Planning Commission, however, were 
showing growth rates as high as 1.6 percent; by January 1990 Peng Pei-
yun, the head of the commission, confirmed the existence of a gap of 30 
percent between the official figures and the estimates of the commis-
sion.53 Clearly, the state's efforts to achieve an average fertility level of 
about 1.7 children per couple were failing. 
At first glance, this failure may appear to confirm Lowenthal's thesis. 
One might argue that the general trend in China is toward demobiliza-
tion, and that the lingering presence of the one-child campaign reflects 
nothing more than the extraordinary nature of China's population di-
lemma. The regime's inability to sustain effective mobilizational efforts 
for more than a few years after the postrevolutionary transition merely 
confirms the long-term causal relationship between the modernization 
process and demobilization. 
The flaw in this argument is that the failed effort cannot be equated 
with the end of mobilizational politics. The overall success or failure of 
a campaign never provided grounds for bringing the mobilizational 
character of the Maoist regime into question. Mao's two most famous 
efforts, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, were both 
spectacular failures if judged by his own initial goals. The Great Leap 
ss Qi Bangmi, "The Alarm Bell of Population Tolls Again," Ban Yue Tan 23 (December 
1988), 15-16, in FBIS, January 18, 1989, p. 25; Xinhua, December 13, 1989, in FBIS, January 
5, 1989, P· 5· 
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did not boost agricultural yields or accelerate China's march to commu-
nism, and the Cultural Revolution did not prevent the routinization of 
party rule. Yet the mass campaign was a defining characteristic of the 
Maoist period. In the post-Mao era, rising birth rates alone do not imply 
that campaigns are no longer employed. Campaigns continue to be the 
most effective means by which party leaders concentrate effort on spe-
cific tasks and overcome bureaucratic inertia and grassroots resistance. 
In addition, they fill an important gap in the state's capacities below the 
county level by prompting township- and village-level cadres to behave 
in ways that reflect the priorities of their superiors. By setting the goals 
and the time frame for achieving specific tasks, and by linking cadre 
evaluations to the fulfillment of those tasks, the party can increase the 
probability of effective grassroots implementation. 
Several other factors provide a better explanation for the failure of 
institutionalized mobilization to achieve the ambitious goals of the cen-
tral elite. To begin with, the goals themselves remain extremely ambi-
tious, despite relaxations in the one-child rule. According to current pol-
icy, all urban couples are limited to one child, with very few exceptions. 
In the countryside, all couples whose first child is a girl are now eligible 
to have a second child after an interval of about four years; the same goes 
for couples who fit a variety of other categories (for example, those whose 
first child is seriously handicapped, or a husband who breaks tradition 
by moving into his wife's family home). No one is eligible for a third 
child, with the exception of certain small nationality populations living 
in sparsely populated areas. These guidelines may appear lenient by the 
impossibly strict rules of the early 1980s, but in China's agricultural so-
ciety they are considered extremely strict and are difficult to enforce, 
even with campaign methods. 
Moreover, for mobilization to be successfully deployed, at least one of 
three prerequisites must be met. The first concerns incentives. In earlier 
efforts to engineer change in the countryside, success depended on being 
able to offer material as well as normative incentives to a mobilizable 
constituency.54 Great efforts were made to do just that in the early 1980s, 
when one-child couples received preferential health care, infant and 
child subsidies, extra plots ofland, and other material rewards.55 By 1984, 
however, as the one-child policy settled into a fundamental state policy, 
the rationale for special rewards for compliance began to erode, as did 
"Dittmer (fn. 1), 39-43 and 237-38; Vivienne Shue, Peasant China in Transition: The Dy-
namics of Development toward Socialism, 1949--1956 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1980), 326--27. 
55 White (fn. 23), 284-317. 
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the local resources to provide them. In addition, pressures to reduce the 
expenses of township government led to cuts in family planning subsi-
dies and bonuses.56 As a result, by the mid-198os cadres and bureaucrats 
urged family planning on grounds of delayed material gratification, a 
line that did little to offset preferences for multiple sons as the path to 
short-term happiness and long-term wealth and security. 
Second, sustained and successful mobilization requires organizational 
stability.57 Where turnover among local leaders or a target population is 
high, patterns of mobilization, study, and enforcement are constantly 
disrupted by personnel change. Although China's rural leadership has 
remained relatively stable, organizational changes, retirements, entrepre-
neurial opportunities, and elections have all contributed to a changing 
composition of the grassroots leadership. More importantly, however, 
the rural population-for the first time since the 195os-now enjoys op-
portunities for mobility that complicate efforts to enforce family plan-
ning through either routine work or mobilization. The reported child-
bearing explosion among the "floating population" of fifty million has 
become the biggest headache for family planning officials, who refer to 
this group as an "excess birth guerrilla corps" and "excess birth floating 
villages."58 The proposed solution-demanding that the urban com-
merce bureaus verify compliance with family planning before issuing 
local commercial licenses to migrant peasants-is no help, since com-
merce bureau officials have neither the time, inclination, or incentive to 
become adjunct family planning officials.59 
Third, and most importantly, in the absence of compelling material 
rewards and organizational stability, mobilization requires a disciplined 
organization for enforcement-precisely the area in which communist 
parties traditionally excel. In this case, however, many cadres (native vil-
lagers themselves) have personally opposed and violated the one-child 
policy from the start. Beijing's disavowal of coercion and rigidly uniform 
implementation has simply given them greater leeway to interpret guide-
lines in ways that suit local preferences. Moreover, despite periodic na-
tion-wide or localized mobilizations, the relatively lax political environ-
ment and stress on economic performance led many to report false 
statistics for family planning work in order to increase bonuses, avoid 
56 Renmin Ribao, June 12, 1984, carries the original text of Central Document 1 (1984). For 
a translation, see China Quarterly IOI (March 1985), 132-42. 
"Walder (fn. 9), I 14-20. 
• 8 Guo Xiao, "The 'Population Explosion' Is Drawing Near," Jingji Ribao, January rn, 
1989, in FBJS, February 3, 1989, p. 51. 
59 China Daily, July 30, 1987, p. 3; Yunnan Provincial Service, January 3, 1988, in FBIS, 
January 5, 1988, p. 44; Xinhua, January 26, 1988, in FBJS, January 28, 1988, pp. 16-17; Renmin 
Ribao, June 4, 1985, p. 3· 
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sanctions, meet the terms of their responsibility contracts, and reduce per 
capita tax levies.60 Other cadres devised a middle course that linked nom-
inal enforcement to personal and collective self-interest. Rather than try 
to prevent excess births, they used them as a fundraising tool, collecting 
penalties for infractions and investing them in local projects. In one re-
port, a village party secretary was quoted as saying that in "four or five 
days' time," the village had collected 10,000 yuan, "just enough to pave 
a village road." The reporter condemned this practice of encouraging 
"fundraising births" as an "evil embryo" (guaitai) that should be termi-
nated, but the problem was not simply one of cadre deviance at the vil-
lage level. In some areas, the money-starved family planning bureau-
cracy was dependent on the collection of fines to pay salaries and 
bonuses.61 This preoccupation with fundraising went even further: mo-
bilization campaigns intended to prevent excess births were perverted 
into fundraising campaigns, with local cadres assigned targets for the 
collection of fines, and with campaigns timed to occur when peasants 
were flush with cash.62 Paradoxically, campaigns thus became the vehicle 
by which routine bureaucratic work could be sustained, giving the bu-
reaucrats themselves a direct interest in perpetuating mobilizational 
methods. 
In short, during the 1980s the requirements for effective mobilization 
were undermined by the successful implementation of other elite goals. 
Deepening problems with routine implementation and enforcement, 
however, elicited new demands for mobilization from unusual sources. 
In family planning, these demands did not come from conservatives 
threatened by the reforms, but from reform-minded experts and observ-
ers who feared the economic impact of population growth. 
In 1988 and 1989 their anxieties broke to the surface. The revelation, 
in late 1988, that the 1987 birth rate was significantly higher than origi-
nally reported by the State Statistical Bureau, that third or additional 
births continued to account for as much as 17 percent of annual births, 
and that urban couples were also pushing for additional births, caused 
growing apprehension over inadequate birth control efforts and the po-
tential "tragedy" of failing to control population growth.63 In Hebei, 
60 Qu Yibin, "Woguo renkou chushenglu mingxian huishengde yuanyin ji duice tantao," 
[Reasons for our country's obvious increase in birth rate and inquiry into countermeasures], 
Renkou Yanjiu 2 (March 1988), pp. 54-55; Zhong Cheng, "Delegates and Members Show 
Concern for Family Planning," Zhongguo Xinwen She, April 11, 1988, in FBIS, April 13, 
1988, p. 33· 
6 ' Jiang Su and Yang Shounian, "'Jizi shengyu' buzu qu" [Do not permit the pursuit of 
'fundraising births'], Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun 4 (1988), 25. 
°' Interview with former township-level family planning cadre, March 1, 1990. 
63 Henan Provincial Service, January 21, 1989, in FBIS, January 25, 1989, p. 53. 
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these concerns led to the creation of an extraordinary coordinating body, 
the "family planning leading small group," to increase province-wide 
attention to family planning.64 Such groups, which were pervasive in the 
1970s and early 1980s, had been replaced in the mid-198os by regular 
state organs and local family planning commissions. What was most tell-
ing, however, was an escalating debate between what might be called the 
state family planning establishment, on the one hand, and opposition 
professionals, social scientists, and party officials, on the other. The latter 
group argued that relaxation of the one-child policy was a mistake, and 
held policy makers and "personnel changes" responsible.65 After this 
charge appeared in Guangming Ribao in March 1988, officials of the State 
Family Planning Commission felt obliged to respond at their national 
meeting shortly thereafter. China Daily, for example, reported: 
The policy that allows rural couples with only one daughter to have one 
more child after a certain period has proved reasonable and is not the 
reason for the rapid growth of China's population in recent years, it was 
agreed at a national meeting of the State Family Planning Commission. 
66 
Around the same time, an article in Renmin Ribao pointed out that the 
desire for a rapid push for zero or negative population growth must be 
carefully balanced against the problem of an aging population.67 
The debate intensified in 1989, with Jingji Ribao picking up the call 
for a stricter birth control policy. Two articles, the first on January ro 
and the second on January 24, stressed the impending population crises 
and asked, "How many centuries must it take before people can be 
awakened?"68 The second, arguing that a "human wave is washing over 
China," pointed to the 1980 Marriage Law, the stimulating effect of the 
agricultural responsibility system on rural child-bearing preferences, and 
the relaxation of policy after 1984 as three key "policy faults."69 It is the 
final paragraphs, however, that reveal the changed rationale for mobili-
zation. Dismissing "gloomy and feeble propaganda and education" as 
useless in an environment where "people no longer fear punishment," 
the author blasted the family planning bureaucracy and "policy-makers" 
for their timidity; he concluded: 
64 Hebei Ribao, September 16, 1988, p. 1, in FB/5, October 12, 1988, p. 64-
65 Liu Jingzhi, "Experts Concerned Are Not Optimistic about China's Population Situa-
tion, and Think that Interference by Officials Is an Important Reason Why Birth Rate Has 
Risen Again," Guangming Ribao, March 6, 1988, p. 2., in FB/5, March 18, 1988, pp. 14-15. 
66 China Daily, April 19, 1988, p. 1. 
67 Wu Canping and Du Ya jun, "Several Questions on the Chinese Population," April 15, 
1988, in FB/5, April 19, 1988, pp. 48---49. 
68 The quote is from Xie Zhenjiang, "There Is No Route of Retreat," fingji Ribao, January 
24, 1989, in FB/5, February 15, 1989, p. 35; see also Guo Xiao (fn. 58), 50-52. 
69 Xie (fn. 68), 36-37. 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 15:44:50 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
POSTREVOLUTIONARY MOBILIZATION IN CHINA 
As happy peace must be built on the foundation of powerful military 
strength, so are the people's voluntary and self-conscious actions to be 
formed on the basis of the legal and compulsory standard. We should 
justly and forcefully say that we must punish those who have turned a deaf 
ear to dissuasion from having additional children and from unscrupu-
lously having additional children and that suitable coercion and control 
should be implemented in China's family planning . 
. . . Only if the country adopts effective and compulsory policies and at 
the same time, carries out propaganda and education, can the conscious-
ness of the society be aroused. If we do not understand this problem and 
change the current situation soon, when we wake up in a number of years, 
we shall find that it will be too late.7° 
73 
This message is a plea for effective mobilization. Despite its open advo-
cacy of the use of coercion and compulsion, however, it is not a plea to 
re-create the disruptive mass campaign formula of the Maoist past. On 
the contrary, it is notable for its emphasis on enforcement of the "legal 
and compulsory standard," the adoption of "effective and compulsory 
policies," and for its denigration of "gloomy and feeble propaganda and 
education"-language out of character with the mobilization politics of 
the Maoist period. Instead of a disruptive mass campaign, the author 
calls for a targeted effort to enforce regulations already in place, and to 
create new, more effective ones where necessary. In short, it is a call for 
party mobilization to implement social policy by all necessary means, 
including force, but not for mobilization on a mass scale, 
SOURCES OF MOBILIZATION IN CHINESE POLITICS 
In contrast to the hypotheses of Lowenthal and Jowitt, I have argued 
that China in its postrevolutionary phase has not abandoned mobiliza-
tional methods to achieve party-defined goals. That is not to say that 
China remains a mobilization regime, but rather that mobilizational 
methods have been recast in ways that make them useful to the reformist 
elite. The result has been a variant form of campaign politics which I 
call institutionalized mobilization. A final objection that might be raised 
to this analysis is that the case of the one-child policy is unique, and 
therefore cannot be fairly projected on China's postrevolutionary politics 
in general. Since there is no denying that China's demographic dilemma 
is unique, the question is whether or not it has provoked a unique polit-
ical solution. 
The political trajectory of the one-child policy has been anything but 
exceptional. On the contrary, it has accurately mirrored the foremost 
7" Ibid., 37. 
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political dilemma of the Deng regime in the 198os--engineering rapid 
socioeconomic modernization within prescribed Leninist boundaries 
while relaxing tight political controls. Although the death of Mao in 1976 
paved the way for the abandonment of the Maoist path to development 
and his radical revolutionary vision, Deng Xiaoping's alternative vision, 
which began to crystallize in 1978, was also radical and ambitious. Un-
like Khrushchev, Deng was prepared to do more than merely repudiate 
the political excesses of his famous predecessor. He embarked on a mod-
ernization strategy that swiftly and fundamentally reversed the deeply 
rooted Maoist approach. That reversal demanded a deradicalized politi-
cal environment. But the degree of societal adjustment required for re-
form, the formidable political opposition to be overcome, and the scope 
of Deng's reform goals called for the skillful utilization of a familiar 
political process-mobilization of both party and society to break out of 
old political and economic routines in favor of new ones. 
This effort to reorder an existing socialist society began with a denun-
ciation of political campaigns and mass movements; but it was followed 
by a spate of dramatic reform initiatives that demanded full mobilization 
of the party machine. In the countryside, for example, there were tree 
planting campaigns, electoral reform campaigns, drives to reduce the col-
lective burdens on peasants, the drive to build a socialist spiritual civili-
zation, and, of course, the drive to decollectivize universally and to intro-
duce household contracting. None of these mobilization drives 
resembled the radical mass campaigns of the Maoist era, and local party 
cadres sometimes lagged behind enthusiastic peasants. Nevertheless, the 
basic process of pushing through comprehensive reforms between 1978 
and 1983 followed the Leninist, or "engineering," approach to social 
change-mobilization of the party and mass organizations to take the 
lead in implementation, and skillful and massive use of the propaganda 
apparatus to build support for the reformist line and to isolate political 
opponents. 
This brings into question the presumption of a static definition of mo-
bilization as a process of calculated disruption in pursuit of utopian ends. 
The purpose of mobilization during the stage of socialist transformation 
was the disruption of bourgeois social arrangements and routines in fa-
vor of new socialist arrangements;7' in Deng Xiaoping's postrevolution-
ary regime, the purpose of mobilization is to ensure the responsiveness 
of local cadres to higher-level initiatives, and to gain societal compliance 
with party efforts to reorder the established institutions and routines of 
socialism. The party remains the instrument of mobilization and di-
'' Jowitt (fn. 7). 
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rected change, but an atmosphere of orderly determination replaces that 
of "crisis and attack."72 Mobilization has ceased to be synonymous with 
permanent revolution, but it remains an essential tool for implementing 
far-reaching reform while enforcing political orthodoxy. Crises of polit-
ical power, like the Beijing Spring of 1989, may trigger a reversion to all 
or most of the revolutionary campaign methods of the past, but mobili-
zational methods also play important, if more subdued, roles in accom-
plishing ordinary policy goals on a national or local scale. 
The party's continued reliance on mobilizational methods derives 
from the lingering memory of the institutionalized role that campaigns 
played during the Maoist era and the defining tendency of Leninist par-
ties to rely on directed mobilization as the basic approach to political 
change and control. Beyond these institutional bases, however, the lon-
gevity of mobilization in China is rooted in structural and political fac-
tors. 
A chronic and enduring problem in China's vast countryside is that 
the elite's demands outstrip regular bureaucratic capacities to meet them. 
In China, all bureaucratic trails lead to township and village leaders. 
Unlike the county-level bureaucratic apparatus, however, township gov-
ernments lack the manpower and the skills to routinize party and gov-
ernment work effectively on a consistent basis. At the village level, lead-
ers cease to be full-time employees of the state, and their lack of mobility 
at this level makes them permanent fixtures in their native communities. 
Although this organizational arrangement was essential to the transfor-
mation of rural China and the consolidation of the CCP's rule, the dual 
face of village leaders has always posed obstacles to the implementation 
of central policies that run counter to village interests. Although the lead-
ership routinely tolerated a degree of slippage and corruption at the vil-
lage level, its single most effective device for containing that slippage was 
the mass campaign. Social transformation was therefore only one of the 
motivations for the mobilizational approach to policy implementation. 
The other was the prevention of organizational decay at the grassroots. 
With this tradition of rur,al mobilization so deeply rooted in the col-
lective memory and so crucial to the maintenance of a disciplined party 
organization (attributes that separate the Chinese experience sharply 
from that of the Soviet Union), the formal repudiation of political cam-
paigns did little to alter the behavioral response of local cadres who had 
a limited repertoire of leadership methods. In the short run, patterns 
established over decades ensured that party cadres remained highly sen-
sitive to mobilizational cues from the center-so much so that they were 
7' David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1965), 360. 
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still susceptible to the political sins of overzealousness and "command-
ism" (exercising arbitrary and dictatorial rule).73 
Over time, however, the decentralization and diversification of power 
resulting from successful reform eroded both the fear of retribution and 
the promise of meaningful reward necessary to mobilize society effec-
tively, and altered the relationship of the party center to the far-flung 
party rank and file. As local cadres were rewarded more for economic 
entrepreneurship than for political discipline, and as the demands of 
newly empowered provincial or county officials took precedence over 
Beijing's instructions, old forms of political deviance gave way to new 
ones. "Coercion and commandism" (qiangpo mingling) in family plan-
ning yielded to neglect and to falsification of records; more broadly, eco-
nomic commandism and leftism were replaced by corruption and bour-
geois liberalization as the most dangerous forms of political deviance. 
Yet mobilization campaigns did not disappear. Instead, they were uti-
lized by central, provincial, and even county officials as a routine method 
for getting things done.74 Moreover, as fiscal austerity started to impede 
government work in the late 1980s, mobilization became a convenient 
bureaucratic tool for overriding fiscal constraints by placing temporary 
political pressure on reluctant cadres. 
Mobilization of some sort may not necessarily remain a permanent 
feature of Chinese politics. The perpetuation of variant forms of mobi-
lization in postrevolutionary China, however, does bring into question 
the dichotomous phasing of communist state evolution implied in earlier 
models. The campaign method, which implies a mobilizational override 
of routine bureaucratic procedure, is an institutional and procedural cor-
relate of Communist Party rule in China. Rather than dying away in the 
postrevolutionary era in favor of routinized, Weberian bureaucratism, 
institutionalized forms of mobilization have found common ground 
with bureaucratic process.75 Regardless of official rhetoric, neither mod-
ernization writ large nor the death of Deng Xiaoping and other revolu-
tionary elders is therefore likely to extinguish this form of campaign. 
That would require a more fundamental rearrangement of the structure 
of power than China's Leninist rulers have been willing to permit. 
7.l Stuart R. Schram, Ideology and Policy in China since the Third Plenum, 1978-84, Research 
Notes and Studies No. 6 (London: Contemporary China Institute, School of Oriental and 
African Studies, 1984). 
74 For example, Michel Oksenberg reports that campaigns were utilized by county officials 
in Zouping county, Shandong Province. See his "Preliminary Impressions of Zouping 
County Level Government" (Paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual 
Conference, Chicago, April 6-9, 1990). 
75 The implications for a single pattern of political authority and a non-Weberian form of 
bureaucratic evolution parallel the conclusions of Walder (fn. 9), chaps. 7 and 8. 
